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1. Introduction 
 
Traditionally, Higher Education Institutions (hereafter HEIs) have focused their efforts on 
teaching and research. However, over the last two decades, above all in industrialized countries, 
universities and governments alike have increased their investment in innovation and research 
commercialization, fostering more effective and have been encouraging more effective linkages 
between universities, governments and firms (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1997 and 2000; 
Etzkowitz 1998). This investment has been driven by the perceived need to smooth Technology 
Transfer (TT), ensuring university innovations promote the required economic and social 
development (Geiger 2004; Mowery 2007). At the same time, the motivation for HEIs to 
commercialize their research has grown for a variety of reasons, including the opportunity it 
affords to generate new sources of income and to strengthen links with public and private firms. 
 
Since the early 80s, studies examining the economics of higher education have recognized the 
possible presence of economies of scale in the output of the universities (Brinkman and Leslie 
1986) and many papers (James 1978; Jimenez 1986; Cohn et al. 1989; Cohn and Geske 1990; 
de Groot et al. 1991; Lloyd et al. 1993; Koshal and Koshal 1995 and 1999; Hashimoto and 
Cohn 1997; Johnes 1997; Longlong et al. 2009; among others) have analyzed both economies of 
scale and of scope within HEIs, by focusing their attention on the relationship between total 
university expenditure and teaching and research outputs. 
 
Cohn et al. (1989) was one of the first studies to analyze the system of HEIs in the United States 
by adopting a multi-product cost function approach. They computed economies of scale and 
scope for a sample of 1,887 HEIs, covering virtually all institutions awarding four-year degrees 
in America. This study was later extended by de Groot et al., (1991). First, they examined a 
subsample of 147 doctorate-granting universities, from which they drew specific conclusions 
regarding the economies of scale and scope for universities with a marked research 
specialization. Second, they conducted a sensitivity analysis of their cost function estimates for 
various measures of research output, and finally, they tested the impact of the state regulation of 
personnel and financial administrative practices on production efficiency in HEIs. 
 
In a subsequent study, Koshal and Koshal (1995) introduced the relationship between cost and 
quality, stressing that earlier studies had ignored this feature when explaining the cost variations 
between HEIs. They argued the importance of assuming that average university costs vary 
according to the quantity and quality of their outputs. Moreover, in a later paper (Koshal and 
Koshal 1999) they noted the importance of differentiating HEIs according to their specific 
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goals, claiming it was inappropriate to perform the same analysis for small teaching colleges 
and large research-focused universities. 
 
The main conclusions drawn from these preceding studies are the existence of ray economies of 
scale, product-specific economies of scale and economies of scope in the production of teaching 
and research outputs. However, the marginal cost coefficients associated with these outputs vary 
significantly across the different studies.  
 
Discussions regarding the complementarity or substitutability of research and teaching outputs 
have tended to stress different features. The research findings conclude that HEIs behave as 
multi-product firms, in which the presence of economies of scale and scope is relevant. 
However, in recent years, the goals of universities have extended well beyond their two primary 
functions of research and teaching, and gradually, TT has acquired more and more importance 
for universities, governments and the private sector. However, to date, little has been said about 
the presence of economies of scale and scope in the production and transmission of knowledge 
in universities, when approached from the perspective of research and TT outputs. 
 
This paper empirically analyzes the presence of economies of scale and economies of scope in 
the simultaneous production of research and TT outputs in the Spanish public university system. 
We employ a flexible fixed cost quadratic (FFCQ) function, relating total university R&D 
expenditure and the cost of transferring technology to different outputs of research and TT. 
Once the cost function is estimated, we calculate the ray economies of scale, the product-
specific economies of scale and the economies of scope.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we analyze the HEIs’ research and TT cost 
function, describing the total cost of the production of research and the transfer of technology. 
Section 3 describes the methodology used in this study. Section 4 explains the data employed, 
the estimation results and the calculation of the ray economies of scale and economies of scope. 
Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The HEIs research and technology transfer cost function. 
 
The objective of this paper is to estimate a multi-output cost function for HEIs, and to calculate 
the degree of scale and scope economies in their production of research and technology transfer. 
To do this, we first need to identify the total costs associated with their production of 
knowledge, and then establish the different outputs of this production function. 
 
3
 
 
Total costs of research and technology transfer 
 
The total costs of the HEI production of research and technology transfer are approximated by 
university expenditure on R&D activities plus the cost of transferring technology. R&D 
expenditure in Spain is calculated following the international standards in their definition of 
R&D expenditure, in this definition, the R&D espenditure comprises two elements: (i) salaries, 
including wages, remunerations and complementary expenditure on R&D personnel and; (ii) 
other current expenditure, including the purchase of materials, supplies and support equipment, 
etc. Moreover, we include the cost of transferring technology based on the total budget of the 
university’s technology transfer office (TTO). This variable measures the capacity of the TTO 
and proxies the quantity of technology transferred. 
 
We consider university expenditure on R&D to be a good measure for approximating the total 
costs of production of research and TT, since it represents the share of the budget specifically 
devoted to these activities, thereby allowing us to avoid analyzing teaching outputs, which are 
not the focus of this paper. 
 
Research and technology transfer outputs 
 
HEIs are extremely complex organizations that seek the simultaneous achievement of multiple 
goals (Cohn et al. 1989) and, as such, the identification of their inputs and outputs is equally 
complex. University outputs should present two primary characteristics: first, they need to be 
clearly separable from among all the university’s distinct objectives, and second, they should be 
homogeneous and comparable across different HEIs. The absence of any consensus as to what 
might constitute appropriate outputs for research and TT should be stressed. 
 
Research outputs 
 
Research outputs should, ideally, consist of a range of items, including publications, patents, 
research reports, etc. However, such outputs are not always homogeneous among HEIs and, for 
this reason, these institutions are not always comparable. In the various analyses undertaken of 
the economies of scale and scope of HEIs, research outputs have been approximated in a variety 
of ways, for example, Cohn et al. (1989) used the total sum of research grants received by an 
HEI. Elsewhere, the level of research expenditure of each HEI has been adopted (Koshal & 
Koshal 1999, and Longlong et al. 2009). By contrast, de Groot et al. (1991) used an HEI’s total 
number of publications as their proxy of research output.  
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Here, we propose using the total number of scientific articles published in journals indexed in 
the Journal of Citation Reports (JCR) as our indicator. We believe this measure approximates 
research output better than research grants received and an HEI’s level of research expenditure 
as in some instances the latter are used for purposes other than research. Furthermore, by taking 
into consideration JCR scientific articles we not only control for the heterogeneity of scientific 
production, but we are also able to control for quality, as the JCR is the standard in scientific 
research.  
 
 Technology transfer outputs 
 
According to Landry et al. (2006), the TT indicators should represent the conversion of 
technology into products that are easily amenable to commercial transactions. As such, TT 
indicators should represent the instrumentality of knowledge. In the literature, a large number of 
variables have been used to approximate TT from universities to the private and public sector. 
These variables can be classified into four groups: the first group is associated with intellectual 
property, and includes indicators such as communications of inventions, patent applications and 
non-disclosure agreements that protect university know-how. The second group comprises 
licenses and options, such as firm licenses to use and exploit technologies developed by 
universities. The third group consists of R&D contracts and collaboration agreements between 
businesses and universities. Finally, the fourth group refers to the creation of firms within HEIs, 
whether based on the knowledge generated by universities (spin-off) or entrepreneurial 
companies formed by university students or teachers, albeit not based on specific knowledge 
created by universities (start-ups). The most common indicators of technology transfer are the 
number of patents or their associated royalties (Siegel et al. 2008; Spyros et al. 2008; Thursby 
and Thursby 2007, among others) and the number and value of R&D contracts (Link et al. 
2007; Link and Siegel 2005; Spyros et al. 2008 and Brouwer 2005, among others).  
 
The technology transfer variable used in this paper consists of 3 measures: (i) the total value of 
private R&D sub contracted to universities; (ii) the total income generated by the private use of 
university licenses; and (iii) the total income from technical support offered by universities This 
measure is a good approximation of the technology generated in HEIs and transferred to society, 
and at the same time, it gives us an idea of the quality of this technology, since the total value is 
not only a proxy of the capacity to transfer technology, but also of the quality of the technology 
transferred. 
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Faculty salary 
 
The literature analyzing economies of scale and scope in the HEIs has examined the benefits of 
introducing input prices in the multi-product cost function. Thus, according to Cohn et al. 
(1989) and Koshal and Koshal (1999), HEIs are labor-intensive firms and, as such, the faculty is 
the most important input price, being capable of altering the output mix. Therefore, they claim 
faculty salaries must be included in the multi-product cost function. By contrast, de Groot et al. 
(1991) argue that the academic market is a competitive market and a variation in faculty salaries 
will only reflect a variation in productivity; therefore, they claim that there is no point in 
calculating returns to scale at a given salary level.  
 
In our case, faculty salaries capture a number of specific university characteristics, including the 
academic staff structure and the age of the staff, as well as regional differences, given that 
Spain’s university wages are subject to components that may vary from one region to another. 
These characteristics should, therefore, be taken into account when calculating the total cost 
function. Nonetheless, the faculty salary coefficients are used here only as a control variable, 
and not as a factor that explains variations in the cost function. 
 
3. Methodology: the multi-product cost functions 
 
In the specification of the cost function we follow the work of Baumol, Panzar and Willig 
(1982) (hereafter BPW). The chosen functional form model is a flexible fixed cost quadratic 
function (FFCQ). The FFCQ function becomes 
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Where C is the university cost, in our case, the R&D expenditure, α, a constant term, the βi’s 
and the δij’s are scalars, and ε is an error term, and the Y’s represent the various outputs. 
 
We also include both linear and quadratic terms for input prices, as well as the interaction terms 
associated with the different outputs. In principle this specification sacrifices the linear 
homogeneity property of the function with respect to factor prices, but according to Cohn et al. 
(1989) when analyzing the characterization of HEIs, the linear homogeneity property is not 
relevant to the analysis of institutions of this kind. However, HEIs are labor-intensive 
organizations; therefore the faculty salary is the most important input price and it may well alter 
the output mix. On the other hand, the faculty salary is a way to control for unobservable 
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heterogeneity across different universities since it can capture regional and institutional 
differences. Finally, in the case of HEIs, it is reasonable to expect a positive bidirectional 
relationship between the quantity of output produced and faculty remuneration. 
 
Economies of scale and scope  
 
Following the BPW model, we are able to distinguish, on the one hand, the ray economies of 
scale by measuring the overall scale economies and the product-specific economies of scale and, 
on the other, the economies of scope, by measuring the degree of complementarity between 
outputs. 
 
The ray economies of scale: let C(Y) be the total cost of producing the “N” outputs (Yi), and let 
Ci = 
iY
YC δδ )(  be the marginal cost of producing the ith output. Then the ray economy of scale 
coefficient, Sn(Y), is defined by: 
 
( ) ( )
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1
      (2) 
 
Ray economies of scale exist if Sn(Y) is greater than unity, and diseconomies of scale are 
present when Sn(Y) is lower than one. 
 
The degree of product-specific economies of scale with respect to product “i” at Y, Si(Yi) is 
defined as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )YCY
YCYC
YS
ii
in
ii
−−=      (3) 
 
Where C(Yn-i) is the cost of producing all the outputs except the ith. If  is greater (lower) 
than one, we say there exist economies (diseconomies) of scale of producing the Yi. This 
measure is interpretable as the specific return to scale in increasing the production of the 
analyzed output. 
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Economies of scope exist when it is cheaper to produce Yi in conjunction with Yj, as opposed to 
producing these outputs separately. The degree of economies of scope, SCt(Y), for a product set 
“t” is defined as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )YC
YCYCYCYSC tntt
−+= −       (4) 
 
Where C(Yt) is the cost of producing only the outputs in the product set “t”, and C(Yn-t) is the 
total cost of producing all the outputs except those in the subset “t”. Economies of scope exist 
when SCt(Y) > 0. If SCt(Y) is positive at Y, then the fragmentation of production to “t” and its 
complement would increase the total cost. 
 
4. Economies of Scale and Scope  
 
Data and estimation of the multi-product cost function 
 
For the empirical analysis we have created a dataset of 45 public universities in Spain for the 
period 2004-2008. Our information is drawn from three databases: (i) the annual survey 
conducted by the TTO network in Spain provides information concerning total university R&D 
expenditure and the value of their R&D contracts; (ii) the Institute of Documentary Studies on 
Science and Technology (IDSST) provides the number of scientific articles published in JCR 
journals; and (iii) the biannual publication of the Rector’s Conference of Spanish Universities is 
the source for the basic characteristics of each university. Our descriptive statistics are presented 
in Table 1 and the evolution in the main variables considered in this analysis is presented in 
Table 2. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
R&D expenditure (thousands) 202 57,441.39 44,635.64 4,934.00 205,574.00
Value of R&D contracts (thousands) 213 8,030.12 10,464.78 38.00 82,998.08
JCR Publications 228 658.24 538.01 79.00 2,529.00
Faculty salary  (thousands) 228 61.41 11.37 27.85 86.23
 
Table 2. Evolution in the multi-product cost function 
  
R&D 
expenditure* Value of R&D contracts* JCR Publications Faculty salary* 
2004 47,304.52 5,273.98 553.51 57.51 
2005 54,185.19 7,196.04 623.54 59.74 
2006 56,578.21 8,507.26 679.86 61.52 
2007 60,803.08 9,536.93 727.97 62.82 
2008 65,543.12 9,713.39 708.15 65.57 
*thousands. Constant prices of 2002. Geometric mean of values for each year. 
 
As discussed in section 2 above, the variables used to calculate the economies of scale and the 
economies of scope are: (i) total university expenditure on R&D (C(R&D)); (ii) total value of 
R&D contracts (TT); (iii) number of JCR articles (R); and (iv) the average faculty salary (FS).  
 
For the empirical analysis we first used OLS estimation, and following Koshal and Koshal 
(1999) we tested the residuals for heteroscedasticity. The Breusch-Pagan test revealed the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, and suggested a different estimation procedure. In a second step, 
we estimated a fixed effects panel data approach but the estimation results still showed 
heteroscedasticity problems. Finally we estimate a cross-sectional, times-series, generalized 
least squares controlling for heteroscedasticity. We also estimate the model without the faculty 
salary, and the results hold almost constant. From equation (1) presented in section 3, the FFQC 
function becomes:  
 
[ ] ittititititititit TTTTRRTTRDRC εγλλλββα +++++++= 2221221111 21)&(  (5) 
 
Where Cit(R&D) represents the total R&D expenditure plus the budget of the TTO “i” in the 
period “t”; β and λ are the parameters to be estimated; R and TT are the research and technology 
transfer outputs, respectively;  α is the fixed cost, γt is a time dummy and ε is the error term 
 
According to the results presented in table 3, the coefficients of the variables analyzed are 
statistically significant and present the expected sign. The output coefficients are positive and 
significant, implying that an increase in the level of each output will augment the total 
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university expenditure on R&D. The interaction coefficient between the TT and research 
outputs is significant and negative, suggesting complementarity between these outputs. This 
result holds even when we analyze the multi-product cost function without the faculty salary as 
a proxy of the input price. Furthermore, from the estimated parameters (column 3 and 4) we 
have calculated the total cost, the average cost and the marginal cost and we observe that our 
cost function is well behaved and the global and local concavity conditions are met. This result 
implies that there exists a single level of output that ensures the maximum efficiency; this level 
is reached when the marginal cost equals the average cost, i.e., the scale economy is equal to 
one. 
 
Table 3. Estimation results of the multi-product cost function 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
3.325 3.163 3.325 3.380
Value of R&D contracts 
(0.544)*** (0.596)*** (0.636)*** (0.652)***
1.02·10-04 1.15·10-04 -1.28·10-04 -1.52·10-04
Value of R&D contracts2 
(6.02·10-06)* (6.33·10-06)* (6.64·10-06)* (6.62·10-06)**
72.041 73.313 85.663 90.282
Research 
(7.199)*** (6.606)*** (15.136)*** (15.481)***
0.007 0.005 0.010 0.011
Research2 
(0.004)* (0.003) (0.004)** (0.004)**
-0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
Value of R&D contracts*Research 
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
-2168.727 -1848.967
Faculty Salary -.- -.- 
(406.249)*** (378.830)***
60.084 54.458
Faculty Salary2 -.- -.- 
(7.966)*** (7.657)***
-0.065 -0.069Faculty Salary*Value of R&D 
contracts -.- -.- (0.016)*** (0.016)***
-1.183 -1.389
Faculty Salary*Publications -.- -.- 
(0.515)** (0.528)***
2145.225 -1581.463 21316.91 12381.58
Constant 
(1546.595) (2097.551) (6587.338)*** (7152.882)*
Time effects No Yes No Yes 
Log likelihood -2138.979 -2133.018 -2119.454 -2116.498 
Chi2(4) (time effects) -.- 57.474*** -.- 61.201*** 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. *,**, *** denotes the significance at 90%, 95% and 99%, 
respectively. Estimation based on Generalized Least Squares, controlling for heteroscedasticity. Number 
of observations: 191. Dependent variable is the R&D expenditure. 
 
The faculty salary coefficient is negative and significant (column 3 and 4). This result is 
apparently contradictory, since one would expect the total cost to increase as the faculty salary 
rises and vice versa. However, given that the faculty salary we use here does not correspond 
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directly to the wage paid to academics to do research and TT, this bidirectional relationship 
between the cost and the faculty salary does not apply. Nevertheless, the interaction coefficients 
between the faculty salary and the research and TT outputs are negative and significant. 
Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction of faculty salary with research is significantly higher 
than the coefficient of the interaction between the faculty salary and the TT output. This result 
could be explained by the fact that the faculty salary depends directly on faculty members’ 
research skills. Similarly, a portion of the income from R&D contracts entered into by HEIs and 
private institutions comes to form part of the faculty salary. It is therefore reasonable to expect a 
relationship of complementarity between the faculty salary and the different outputs analyzed. 
 
Calculation of the economies of scale and the economies of scope 
 
The calculation of the economies of scale and scope is based on the estimated results of the 
multi-product cost function including the faculty salary (fourth column of Table 3). From these 
results we can calculate the ray economies of scale, the product-specific economies of scale, and 
the economies of scope, using the set of equations 2-4 presented in section 3 above. 
 
Table 4. Marginal cost of research and TT for different levels of output 
 MgCTT MgCR MgCR/MgCTT 
Min - 50% 2.198 69.933 31.817 
50% - 100% 2.203 71.711 32.522 
100% - 200% 1.372 71.523 52.130 
200% - Max 1.331 75.147 56.450 
 
According to our findings (Table 4), the correlation coefficient between total TT output and the 
marginal cost of TT is negative and equal to -0.402, which implies that the marginal cost of TT 
decreases as TT output increases. By contrast, the correlation coefficient between research 
output and the marginal cost of research is positive and equal to 0.178, which means that an 
increase in output leads to an increment in the marginal cost of this output. Moreover, the 
marginal cost ratio increases with the level of outputs. Thus, for HEIs with high levels of 
research and TT outputs, this result implies that increasing their research output is more 
expensive than increasing their TT output. 
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Table 5. Degree of scale and scope economies for alternative proportions of R&D 
expenditure and TTO budget 
% of mean R&D expenditure Sn(Y) Stt(Ytt) Sr(Yr) SC(Y) 
Min - 50% 1.196 1.827 2.122 1.441 
50% - 100% 1.073 1.850 1.506 0.617 
100% - 150% 0.862 1.073 0.733 -0.355 
150% - Max 0.809 0.691 0.782 -0.348 
Note: The average (100%) R&D expenditure is set at 55.13 millions 
 
The ray economies of scale, the product-specific economies of scale and the economies of scope 
based on a fixed level of R&D expenditure are presented in Table 5. The results show that ray 
economies of scale disappear when the level of expenditure on R&D exceeds the threshold of 
100% of the expenditure on R&D. Likewise, the research specific economies of scale disappear 
at this level of R&D expenditure, while the TT specific economies of scale remain greater than 
one until the level of R&D expenditure exceeds the 150% threshold. The economies of scope 
also disappear when the level of R&D expenditure is higher than 100%. 
 
Table 6. Degree of scale and scope economies for alternative proportions of TT output 
% of mean TT output Sn(Y) Stt(Ytt) Sr(Yr) SC(Y) 
Min - 25% 1.231 1.488 2.371 1.811 
25% - 50% 1.109 1.463 1.621 0.755 
50% - 100% 1.036 1.801 1.268 0.307 
100% - 200% 0.921 1.244 1.040 0.081 
200% - Max 0.788 0.969 0.693 -0.543 
Note: The average (100%) TT output is set at 7.78 millions 
 
Table 7. Degree of scale and scope economies for alternative proportions of research 
output 
% of mean R output Sn(Y) Stt(Ytt) Sr(Yr) SC(Y) 
Min - 25% 1.334 1.414 2.932 2.531 
25% - 50% 1.153 1.791 1.912 1.038 
50% - 100% 1.058 1.698 1.365 0.476 
100% - 200% 0.862 0.981 0.778 -0.305 
200% - Max 0.760 0.756 0.721 -0.253 
Note: The average (100%) research output is set at 657 JCR publications 
 
The ray economies of scale remain greater than one until the level of TT output (Table 6) falls 
below its average, while the specific economies of scale of both research and TT outputs are 
greater than one even when the level of TT output exceeds 200%. Likewise, the economies of 
scope remain positive until the level of TT output is greater than 200%. By contrast, when 
analyzing economies of scale and scope in terms of the level of research output (Table 7), we 
found that the ray economies of scale, the product-specific economies of scale and the 
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economies of scope disappear when research output is greater than 100%, indicating that HEIs 
with a large amount of research outputs undergo diseconomies of scale and that cost 
subadditivity becomes a negative constraint, which implies that the production of research and 
TT outputs separately will lead to lower costs.  
 
Graph 1. Relationship between the ray economies of scale and the economies of scope 
 
 
From Graph 1, we are able to identify two distinct groups of institutions. One is composed of 
HEIs that present neither ray economies of scale nor economies of scope. The HEIs belonging 
to this group are, with few exceptions, the oldest and the largest HEIs in terms of the number of 
academic staff and students. By contrast, the second group consists of 26 HEIs that do present 
economies of scale and scope. The institutions in this group tend to be the newest and smallest 
HEIs. One of the main reasons underlying this result is the fact that the oldest HEIs were 
created with the sole aim of providing teaching outputs; consequently, these HEIs today have an 
organizational structure that was not designed to make research and TT their chief goals. 
Therefore, these universities present diseconomies of scale in the production of research outputs 
and the transfer of technology and cost subadditivity is a negative constraint. Moreover, the 
newest and smallest HEIs are more flexible, enabling them to adopt more efficient production 
structures. 
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Graph 2. Relationship between the research product specific economies of scale and the 
economies of scope 
 
 
Graph 3. Relationship between the TT product specific economies of scale and the 
economies of scope 
 
 
There is a positive bidirectional relationship between the economies of scale (global and 
specific) and the economies of scope. This relationship is basically explained by the high 
correlation between the economies of scope and the research-specific economies of scale (see 
Graph 2), while the degree of adjustment between the scope economies and the TT-specific 
economies of scale, although positive, is lower than in the case of the research economies of 
scale (see Graph 3).  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper has been to calculate and then analyze the economies of scale and 
scope in the production of research and TT outputs. We have used a dataset composed of 45 
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public Spanish universities for the period 2004-2008, in which are recorded their respective 
outputs of research and TT, as well as the total cost of producing these outputs. We have used 
faculty prices to control for a number of  characteristics specific to each HEI. 
 
Our main findings show that there exist ray economies of scale and economies of scope below 
the mean threshold of 100% of R&D expenditure. TT-specific economies of scale remained 
higher than one until mean R&D expenditure exceeded 150%, while research-specific 
economies of scale disappeared when mean R&D expenditure rose above 100%. 
 
When analyzing the degree of economies of scale and scope for alternative levels of outputs we 
found that the ray economies of scale, in addition to the product-specific economies of scale and 
the economies of scope, disappeared when the level of research output exceeded 100%. By 
contrast the specific economies of scale and the economies of scope remained until the level of 
TT output reached 200%. 
 
Finally, we were able to identify two clearly differentiated types of HEI. The first includes the 
group of the oldest HEIs, which have neither economies of scale nor economies of scope; the 
second comprises the newest HEIs, which have both economies of scale and scope. One of the 
main reasons underpinning this result is that the newest and smallest HEIs are more flexible, 
enabling them to adopt more efficient production structures. 
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